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THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECULAR FIRST AMENDMENT 
Chad Flanders* 
INTRODUCTION 
In a decade-old review of two books on constitutional law and 
religion, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager forthrightly made a 
call for more (and better) theorizing about the purpose and point of the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment of the Constitution.1  The two 
books under review, one by Jessie Choper and the other by Steven 
Smith, had failed in this regard; Eisgruber and Sager were especially 
hostile to Smith’s suggestion that theorizing of any sort about the 
religion clauses was (in Smith’s phrase) a “foreordained failure.”2  The 
Supreme Court’s religious jurisprudence, as well, clearly demonstrated 
to Eisgruber and Sager that “[p]recisely what is missing is an 
understanding of what values the Constitution comprehends in its 
commitment to religious liberty; what is missing, in other words, is a 
theory of religious liberty.”3  In that review, Eisgruber and Sager 
presented a truncated version of their own theory on the purpose and 
point of the establishment clauses, a theory they had spelled out in more 
detail in several important articles.4  Now, with the publication of their 
 
 *  M.A., Ph.D., University of Chicago (Philosophy), 2004.  J.D., Yale, 2007.  Judicial 
clerk, Alaska Court System.  I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Michael Neblo, William 
Baude, Christopher Bradley, Eric MacGilvray, and especially Anthony Kronman for 
comments on a much earlier draft. 
 1. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 577 (1996). 
 2. STEPHEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE (1995).   
 3. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 1, at 578.    
 4. Earlier versions of Eisgruber and Sager’s argument can be found in Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Protecting Without Favoring Religiously Motivated 
Conduct, 2 NEXUS 103 (1997); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) 
[hereinafter Religious Freedom Restoration Act] .  But their definitive statement—prior to the 
book—is surely Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1245 (1994) [hereinafter Vulnerability of Conscience].   
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book, Religious Freedom and the Constitution,5 we have the most 
comprehensive statement yet of their perspective on the religion clauses 
of the United States Constitution.6  It is an important statement, beyond 
their merely practical proposals for cleaning up a notoriously messy area 
of doctrine. 
Upon studying the book, however, readers might justifiably feel 
that they have been given an interpretation of Hamlet that leaves out the 
Prince.  The central thesis of Religious Freedom might be articulated as 
follows: religious belief is to be afforded no more or no less protection 
than any other deep spiritual (or equally fundamental) commitment of 
any other citizen.  Religion, in other words, gets equal protection, but 
should not be singled out, either for privilege or for persecution.7  Earlier 
calling this principle one of “equal regard,”8 Eisgruber and Sager now 
prefer the phrase “equal liberty.”9  In their words, the principle of equal 
liberty “denies that religion is a constitutional anomaly, a category of 
human experience that demands special benefits and/or necessitates 
special restrictions.”10  Religion is to be protected along with any other 
human pursuit, sacred or profane, to which citizens can reasonably put 
their minds. 
This Article is not a book review in the traditional sense; it will not 
evaluate (certainly not chapter by chapter) the particular claims and 
policy recommendations that Eisgruber and Sager have made.  Rather, it 
attempts to diagnose how we arrived at this state, that is, the state in 
which it is considered plausible to give an interpretation of the religion 
clauses of the Constitution that, by Eisgruber and Sager’s own 
admission, renders them redundant with other parts of the Constitution.  
In other words, could one consider it a plausible interpretation of the free 
exercise and nonestablishment of religion that these clauses merely 
reinforce the more general constitutional principle of “equal liberty”?  
How could the First Amendment not be seen by its words to privilege 
and even to elevate the practice of “religion”?  In a sense, therefore, 
Eisgruber and Sager’s book is more of a foil rather than a target of this 
Article. 
 
 5. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2007) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM].   
 6. See supra note 4 for earlier versions of their perspective.   
 7. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 13. 
 8. See Christpher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAW AND 
RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 200 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). 
 9. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 6. 
 10. Id. 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I, taking the “long view” 
theoretically, looks at contemporary liberal political theory in order to 
understand why it might be a desideratum of contemporary 
constitutional interpretation that the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment be read as embodying merely the principle of equal regard.  
Contemporary political philosophy, especially contemporary liberal 
political philosophy, defends not the constitutional version of the 
antiestablishment principle, but a broader principle that does not 
privilege or denigrate any of the “comprehensive conceptions” of its 
citizens.11  If we feel, at some level, that our Constitution should embody 
(as much as possible, consistent with the text) our best theories of 
political society, then it should follow that we would want to (again, 
consistent with the text) read this broader nonestablishment principle 
into the Constitution.  Similarly, we would wish to extend “free 
exercise” to cover the activities of all citizens pursuing their own diverse 
conceptions of the good. 
Part II of this Article describes Eisgruber and Sager’s project as 
essentially of this politically liberal sort.  Unfortunately, the two authors 
are incredibly weak in addressing a prima facie objection to their 
projects, which is that the text of the Constitution proclaims that religion 
is to be “singled out” in respect to both its exercise and whether the state 
can establish a religion.12  Eisgruber and Sager gesture, fitfully, at the 
early drafting of the First Amendment, which they concede points rather 
ambiguously, if it points at all, in the direction of “equal liberty.”  At the 
same time, Eisgruber and Sager clearly wish to rest their defense of 
“equal liberty” not on an originalist theory of interpretation, but on a 
broader “moral” reading of the Constitution.  They do not present such 
an argument, however, and this Article attempts to devise one based in 
part on Eisgruber’s work on constitutional interpretation and Ronald 
Dworkin’s idea of the “moral” reading of the Constitution.13 
Part III of this Article presents the beginnings—but only the 
beginnings—of a theory opposed to the one defended by Eisgruber and 
Sager.  According to Dworkin’s theory of interpretation, the best 
 
 11. I take the term “comprehensive conception” (or “comprehensive doctrine”) from 
John Rawls.  See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM  58-66 (2d ed. 1996).   
 12. “Congress shall make no law,” the First Amendment reads in relevant part, 
“respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.       
 13. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).   
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interpretation of a constitutional word or phrase is that which best 
accords it with the fit and the value of the concept behind the word or 
phrase.  The key argument in Part II is that the best interpretation of 
“religion” construes the word in a way which deems all “comprehensive 
doctrines” more or less “religious,” and so religion qua religion (in the 
sense that this denotes a practice involving belief in a god or gods, rather 
than, for example, in simply any belief system) is not specially 
privileged.  The burden of Part III, however, is to suggest that this act of 
abstraction is too abstract, and that the final move, from “religion” to 
“comprehensive doctrine” does not give the best interpretation of 
religion, not in terms of fit with the text of the Constitution, but more 
important, in terms of capturing the unique value of religion.  Of course, 
this defense of the value of religion can only be provisional, but it gives 
us a better research program than the one Eisgruber and Sager have 
devised.  My goal is to give a sense of the theoretical space that must be 
filled before we can obtain a satisfactory theory of the constitutional 
value of religion; the goal is not to fully defend my candidate for the 
unique value of religion.   
I.  LIBERALISM AND RELIGION 
This Part sets the stage for Eisgruber and Sager’s interpretation of 
the religion clauses, my reconstruction of one argument in opposition to 
Eisgruber and Sager’s conclusion (Part II), and my own proposed “best” 
interpretation of the religion clauses (Part III).  Setting this stage requires 
us to step back and abstract from the text of the Constitution and the 
particular challenges presented in interpreting it.  What I want to do, 
instead, is get a grip on the larger theoretical framework that might 
animate any particular reading of the Constitution—to highlight those 
theoretical commitments that might incline one to read the Constitution 
in one way or another, even before confronting its history and the text.  
People bring, wittingly or not, certain theoretical ideals to any 
interpretive task.  People can be more or less conscious of those 
theoretical commitments, and the more we become aware of such 
commitments, the more we can see how they have influenced our 
interpretation of texts.   
In the case of Eisgruber and Sager and, I would hazard to add, 
many other contemporary constitutional theorists, those theoretical 
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commitments are identifiably “liberal.”14  Eisgruber and Sager’s project 
fits well into a further specification of the “liberal” program, one which 
Charles Larmore and John Rawls have called “political liberalism.”15  
We can observe this fit by juxtaposing a quote from Eisgruber and Sager 
with two quotes from Rawls.  In the first chapter of their book, Eisgruber 
and Sager write, “[the] goal in [their] book is to return to the project of 
religious freedom, the project of finding fair terms of cooperation for a 
religiously diverse people.”16  This is their theoretical program in a 
compressed form, and it offers insight into the principles that motivated 
Eisgruber and Sager before they reached their self-assigned job of 
constitutional interpretation.   
Now compare Eisgruber and Sager’s principles to what Rawls calls 
the key question of political liberalism: “How is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who 
remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines?”17  Later, in the same paragraph, Rawls rephrases the 
question in a way that brings his project into even closer alignment with 
Eisgruber and Sager: “How is it possible for those affirming a religious 
doctrine that is based on religious authority, for example, the Church or 
the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception that supports a 
just democratic regime?”18  The answer to this question, Rawls writes in 
the first introduction to Political Liberalism, will involve specifying “the 
fair terms of social cooperation between citizens characterized as free 
and equal yet divided by profound doctrinal conflict.”19 
This Part goes on to tell a story of how Rawls and other political 
liberals have come to ask this particular question, the question of 
providing “fair terms of cooperation” for people who fundamentally 
disagree on religious and philosophical matters.  I give one version of 
the story that should be highly congenial to political liberals.  Then I 
give a contrasting narrative that highlights the importance of religion in 
political society, but this narrative will be less to the liking of political 
liberals.  This will set the stage for Part II and Part III of this Article, 
 
 14. Ronald Dworkin best identifies the brand of constitutional theorist I am describing.  
See DWORKIN, supra note 13. 
 15. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1996); CHARLES E. LARMORE, 
MORALS OF MODERNITY (1996).   
 16. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 4.   
 17. RAWLS, supra note 15, at xxxix (2d ed. 1996). 
 18. Id.   
 19. Id. at xxvii. 
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which consider the argument that our Constitution, contra the ideal of 
political liberals, puts religion on a “special” footing. 
A.  A (Very) Short History of Liberalism and Religion 
Rawls writes in his famous “Reply to Habermas” that he knows of 
no liberals of an earlier generation “who have clearly put forward the 
doctrine of political liberalism.”20  He cites several contemporaries who 
have developed the doctrine alongside of him, but again notes that “it is 
a great puzzle . . . why political liberalism was not worked out much 
earlier” because “it seems such a natural way to present the idea of 
liberalism, given the fact of reasonable pluralism [among competing 
visions of the good] in political life.”21  With characteristic modesty, 
Rawls questions whether political liberalism “has deep faults that 
preceding writers may have found in it that [he had] not seen.”22 
In fact, I think there is an obvious story we can give about why 
political liberalism has only emerged in the way that Rawls and others 
have defended it (for example, Ackerman, Larmore, and to some extent 
Judith Shklar).  I can only give a sketch of this story here, though in its 
broad outlines it should be familiar.  Rawls even suggests some of it in 
his introduction to Political Liberalism, but much of the detail is not 
present.   
Begin with, as Rawls does in the introduction to Political 
Liberalism, the idea that the problem of political liberalism first comes 
about as a problem of religious tolerance, rather than tolerance among 
religious and non-religious views of the world.23  The question, in other 
words, is not about achieving fair terms of cooperation among 
competing views of the world, sacred and secular, but about constructing 
articles of peace among people of differing religions, and in particular, 
people of different sects.  As Rawls puts this (early) view of the 
question, “How is society even possible between those of different 
faiths?  What can conceivably be the basis of religious toleration?”24  
The problem here seems especially intractable because the ideal is to be 
in society with other people of different faiths, not merely in a grudging 
 
 20. The “Reply to Habermas” appears in the second edition of POLITICAL LIBERALISM.  
Id. at 374 n.1. 
 21. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 374. 
 22. Id.   
 23. Id. at xxiv. 
 24. Id. at xxvi. 
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association that Rawls calls a “modus vivendi,” (a temporary peace 
treaty between warring factions).25  How could anyone form a society 
based on respect for other people whom they believe might be on their 
way to hell?26 
According to Rawls, when we have this problem properly in 
perspective, we will see that there are really only two options.27  We are 
dealing with people who disagree profoundly, not merely about the 
appropriate distribution of goods, but with questions of saving peoples’ 
souls.  So either we are faced with “mortal conflict moderated only by 
circumstances and exhaustion,” says Rawls, or some agreement on 
“liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.”28  Political liberalism 
attempts to explain how society might be based on the latter principles, 
rather than the domination of one religion over all other religions.  
Political liberalism attempts, as best as it can, to accommodate the 
conflicts among those who disagree about the true religion, while never 
denying “the absolute depth of that irreconcilable latent conflict.”29 
Recall, again, that we are not yet at the stage of contemporary 
political liberalism, where we tolerate differing “comprehensive 
conceptions.”30  Rather, we are only at the stage where we tolerate 
differing religious views, or even different religious sects (i.e., divisions 
within a single religion).  At this stage, we might hold up John Locke as 
a sort of proto-political liberal, a critical stop on the way to the more 
fully developed view of Rawls, the view that for Rawls and for others 
has “seem[ed] such a natural way to present the idea of liberalism.”31  
Although Locke does not include all differing, reasonable viewpoints as 
part of the commonwealth, he provides a good statement of some ideas 
upon which political liberals will go on to elaborate and expand.  The 
question of whether they can elaborate on Locke’s views without 
fundamentally distorting them will be the subject of the next Section. 
 
 25. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 147.   
 26. Rousseau noted a similar problem in his book, The Social Contract.  See JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, at Book IV, Chapter VIII 122 (G. D. H. Cole 
trans., E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1950) (1762) (“It is impossible to live at peace with those we 
regard as damned; to love them would be to hate God who punishes them: we positively must 
either reclaim or torment them.”).   
 27. RAWLS, supra note 15, at xxvi. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at xxviii. 
 30. See id. at 58-66.   
 31. See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 374 n.1. 
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Locke remains a proto-political liberal in two respects, according to 
this story.  First, he presents his Letter Concerning Toleration as his 
“[t]houghts about the mutual [t]oleration of Christians in their different 
Professions of Religion.”32  This marks the scope of toleration too 
narrowly because it only extends toleration among those who profess 
Christianity.  Locke seemingly extends tolerance to Muslims and, 
perhaps, to Catholics, though there is some controversy about this 
point.33  Nevertheless, this makes toleration overly tied to one 
“comprehensive doctrine”; it looks to toleration within a particular 
community (the Christian community) rather than among all people who 
hold “reasonable” comprehensive doctrines.  So straightaway, in the first 
few sentences of the Letter Concerning Toleration, we realize that 
Locke is not yet completely a “political liberal,” but only a more tolerant 
version of a comprehensive liberal.  It is no longer an advance to say that 
only one sect is the correct one, and instead proclaim that those who 
agree on Christianity but who disagree on particulars are bound to 
tolerate one another.  From the perspective of political liberalism, 
however, this advance has not yet reached its true terminus.  As Andrew 
Koppelman puts the point, Locke’s neutrality “applies only to different 
varieties of Protestant Christianity, not to religion in general.”34   
 Indeed, for Locke, toleration is not simply a political virtue; it is 
instead the “Characteristical Mark of the True Church.”35  This brings us 
to the second way in which Locke is not yet a political liberal, a way that 
seems less harmful than Locke’s first failure.  Locke rests his argument 
for toleration on a specifically theological premise, viz. that true faith 
cannot be coerced, but can only be brought about by the free assent of 
the believer.36  Thus, toleration is in order if conversion to the true faith 
is our goal, because it is only by tolerance, and not by force, that we can 
hope to convert others to the true way, in a way that is authentic rather 
than coerced.37  This is a less severe failure for the political liberal, 
because the political liberal will allow that Locke’s account of free faith 
is indeed one way to affirm the values of the liberal state, including 
 
 32. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 23 (James H. Tully ed., 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1983) (1689).   
 33. See the helpful discussion in JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE & EQUALITY 218-23 
(2002). 
 34. Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633, 641 (2004). 
 35. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 23. 
 36. Id. at 27. 
 37. Id. (“[T]rue and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind, 
without which nothing can be acceptable to God.”).   
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tolerance for those with whom we fundamentally disagree.38  It is, 
however, only one way to affirm the values of a liberal state.  Others 
include an ideal of respect for the autonomy of persons, or skepticism 
about whether we can know what the good is.39  Political liberalism thus 
is more capacious in its possible justifications as well as its scope than 
Locke makes it out to be.   
Now, on the story I am telling, there are two ways that political 
liberals could go wrong at this point, preventing Locke’s proto-political 
liberalism from developing into a Rawlsian political liberalism.  The 
first way is simply to remain Lockean, never realizing that the proper 
scope of tolerance includes all reasonable people, rather than the 
adherents of one particular faith.  Locke was wrong because tolerance 
should extend to all faiths and indeed to those of no faith at all.   
The second way one could go wrong is more subtle, and it involves 
replacing the religious comprehensive doctrine with one that emphasizes 
the free human person rather than the believing Christian (as Locke’s 
did).  One might make this mistake if she believed that the problem with 
Locke’s version of tolerance was its reliance on the wrong 
comprehensive doctrine, and that the solution to this problem was to find 
a better, secular comprehensive doctrine that would be neither as 
divisive nor exclusive as the Christian religious one.  But this would be a 
mistake as well, because it would similarly exclude those who were 
religious and yet reasonable.  It simply would introduce another 
sectarian faith as the basis of the political order, the same problem that 
infected Locke’s program of tolerance. 
One might equate this second way of going wrong to the way in 
which Rawls believes he erred in A Theory of Justice.40  There, Rawls 
seemed to develop a view of liberalism centered on the idea of the 
autonomous subject: the Kantian person who, in Michael Sandel’s 
famous characterization, had no allegiance to a particular conception of 
the good, and who valued himself as a free chooser, unencumbered by 
any previous ties to his community or the good.41  Perhaps this was a 
mistake Rawls needed to make (if he indeed made it42) before he 
 
 38. Rawls cites Locke specifically in this regard.  See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 145, 
145 n.12. 
 39. This is something emphasized by Charles Larmore in his defensive of liberalism.  
See CHARLES E. LARMORE, MORALS OF MODERNITY (1996).   
 40. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 41. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); 
RAWLS, supra note 40, § 40 (defining the “Kantian Interpretation” of his theory of justice).   
 42. I am dubious that Rawls is guilty of this mistake. 
FLANDERS - Final Edit - 26-2 3/3/2008  8:29 PM 
266 Q L R  [Vol. 26:257 
 
corrected himself in Political Liberalism, and realized that both the 
religious version of tolerance and a comprehensive liberalism 
misconstrue the fact of “reasonable pluralism.”43  Even liberalism, then, 
if it is comprehensive and devoted to an idea of autonomy or self-
development, can itself become oppressive over time.44  Even liberalism 
cannot ignore the fact of reasonable pluralism.45  There are many 
different ways of viewing the world, some religious, and some not.  We 
should seek to form a political society that wins adherents from both 
religious and secular people insofar as those people are reasonable.  We 
go wrong if we seek to base our society on religious grounds or on 
secular grounds that are implicitly or explicitly hostile to those religions 
that are reasonable. 
On the story I have just told, the key move away from Locke is to 
realize how his principle of tolerance should extend to disagreement 
more generally, beyond tolerance for those disagreements within a 
religion, so that it includes disagreements between religion and 
irreligion, between the values of individuals and the values of tradition.46  
We can explain why it took so long to develop this insight by 
recognizing, first, that we had to reach the point where we could see 
members of different religious sects as being reasonable, and then we 
had to move beyond this to see how members of different religions can 
be reasonable as well.  Next, we had to reach the point where we could 
see others who subscribe to no religious faith as being reasonable and 
worthy of respect.   
Finally, and I take this to be the point we have reached with 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism, we had to see how we might go too far in 
asserting the secular basis of the state, because even a secular state can 
exclude those religious conceptions that are reasonable.  Political 
Liberalism, in this way, is a correction over a liberalism that has become 
hegemonic.  Thus, we have Rawls’s question in Political Liberalism, 
which asks not how a religious state can tolerate atheists (which in a way 
was Locke’s question, even though he answered it in the negative), but 
 
 43. See Rawls’s important admission in Political Liberalism that even a liberal 
comprehensive doctrine will become oppressive over time if enforced by the state.  RAWLS, 
supra note 15, at 37.   
 44. Id. at 37-38, 38 n.39.   
 45. Id.  
 46. This latter point (about the value of tradition) is an important theme in CHARLES 
LARMORE, THE ROMANTIC LEGACY (1996).   
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how a secular state can be constructed in a way that does not require 
religious believers to abandon the tenets of their faith.47 
Bruce Ackerman does an excellent job of capturing this “mature” 
political liberal sensibility in his article, Should Opera Be Subsidized?48  
There, Ackerman announces a principle of “antiestablishment” that is 
broader than the establishment clause of the First Amendment; it does 
not favor religion, but likewise does not favor opera.49  Ackerman 
writes, “As much as possible, the liberal state should be neutral on such 
matters, leaving it to each citizen freely to determine whether he or she 
should give financial support to the Church of Rome or the one at 
Bayreuth.”50  Ackerman here describes political liberalism in, I think, its 
most developed form.   
In sum, political liberalism reaches its purest form when it does not 
presuppose a religious foundation, or a secular one, but leaves citizens 
free to adopt and pursue their own conception of what gives value to life.  
In doing so, however, Ackerman self-consciously goes beyond the 
original establishment clause, making the “correction” that Rawls made 
in Political Liberalism, so that not even secular goods (such as opera) 
can be the object of endorsement by the state.  He would presumably 
also extend the other prong of the establishment clause, broadening it to 
include not merely the free exercise of religion, but any reasonable 
exercise of a citizen’s power of choice.  Religion, on this view, no longer 
has a special status, a status that the religion clauses seem to give it (both 
negative and positive in its valence).  Religion becomes one 
comprehensive doctrine among many, which may be religious or 
irreligious.  Part II of this Article will consider whether this is a possible 
and plausible interpretation of the religion clauses. 
B.  Locke Revisited 
The version of the story I have just told regards Locke as a “proto” 
political liberal.  That is, he is a step toward contemporary political 
liberalism, which tolerates atheists and believers of other religions in 
addition to those who believe in Christianity.51  The next step, once one 
has realized that she can no more establish a Kantian or Millian state 
 
 47. RAWLS, supra note 15, at xxvi. 
 48. Bruce Ackerman, Should Opera Be Subsidized?, DISSENT, Summer 1999, at 89.   
 49. Id.   
 50. Id. 
 51. See supra Part I.A. 
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than one can establish a Christian state, is to broaden the scope of people 
to whom tolerance is owed.  Contemporary political liberalism thus 
represents the full flowering of liberalism.  Locke’s mistake was not 
disbelieving in tolerance (indeed, in this he was a key innovator), but in 
artificially limiting the scope of tolerance.  In doing so, Locke was 
perhaps simply a product of his time: he saw the task as managing 
toleration between competing religious sects, and took it for granted that 
any consensus—if consensus was possible—would have to be among 
religious believers, and perhaps only among Christian believers.   
Thus far, however, I have omitted a key line and theme in Locke’s 
A Letter Concerning Toleration,52 which makes it a difficult document 
for contemporary political liberals to endorse wholeheartedly.  For 
Locke did not simply overlook atheists in constructing a regime of 
tolerance; he positively excluded them: “Those are not at all to be 
tolerated who deny the Being of a God.  Promises, Covenants, and 
Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon 
an Atheist.”53  Locke ominously concluded, “The taking away of God, 
tho but even in thought, dissolves all.”54  Jeremy Waldron writes in his 
study of Locke’s religious thought that Locke is unclear or evasive when 
it comes to whether Muslims or Roman Catholics should be tolerated, 
but he is highly explicit when it comes to the fact that atheists are not to 
be tolerated.55  Again, it is not that Locke merely fails to consider 
atheists as objects of toleration; he does consider them, and argues that 
they are not to be tolerated at all.56 
This is no place to detail Locke’s reasons for not tolerating 
atheists.57  On its face, however, Locke’s reason is that atheists cannot be 
trusted to keep promises or oaths, something that is at the very 
foundation of civil society.58  If the atheists cannot be trusted in this way, 
then they should not be tolerated.59  More recently, Waldron argued (in 
an admittedly speculative vein) that Locke refused to tolerate atheists 
because he believed they could not truly believe in the equality of all 
 
 52. See LOCKE, supra note 32.   
 53. Id. at 51. 
 54. Id.   
 55. WALDRON, supra note 33, at 223. 
 56. Id. at 225. 
 57. There is a large body of conflicting scholarship on this subject.  See id. at 218-223.   
 58. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 51. 
 59. Id. 
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citizens.60  That is, they do not have good grounds for believing that all 
are equal in God’s eyes, because they disbelieve in God.61  As Waldron 
writes, “Locke’s particular worry about atheists may have less to do with 
their day-to-day involvement in social and commercial life, and more 
with the attitude they are likely to take to the very foundations of the 
social order.”62 
Whatever the correct interpretation, my main interest in introducing 
this key part of Locke’s text is to show how it troubles the political 
liberal narrative recited in the last Section.  According to the 
contemporary political liberal story, the problem with Locke is that he 
simply failed to extend the scope of toleration to atheists; this is an 
oversight that can be remedied.63  This, however, is not how Locke saw 
matters; for him, there was a reason that atheists could not be tolerated.  
Especially if we accept Waldron’s account of Locke’s deeper reason for 
this exclusion, Locke cannot be accommodated easily into the 
triumphalist of political liberalism’s rise; in fact, he positively resists 
being written into that story.  For Locke, the decision to extend the 
regime of tolerance to atheists is a mistake because atheists question 
premises that are at the very foundation of the social order.   
The point of presenting this alternative interpretation of Locke and 
liberalism is to reveal a tendency to ignore the way in which religion 
might be special, and the complementary tendency to view religion on 
par with other ways of viewing the world.  For Locke, the difference 
between belief and nonbelief is stark and decisive; it is the difference 
between a view that is reasonable and tolerable, and a view that 
“dissolves all.”64  Parts II and III of this Article argue that something 
similar occurs in Eisgruber and Sager’s interpretation of the religion 
clauses of the Constitution.  The Constitution, in its own way, can be 
construed as Lockean in its treatment of religion.  To be sure, it can be 
read so that atheists are not excluded from the regime of tolerance (at 
least I hope one can plausibly read it in this way!).  At the same time, the 
Constitution, in its own way, treats religion as special in the sense that 
the state cannot establish a religion, and that a person’s ability to 
 
 60. WALDRON, supra note 33, at 218-23.  Waldron had earlier emphasized Locke’s 
usefulness for modern liberals.  See JEREMY WALDRON, Locke, Toleration, and the 
Rationality of Persecution, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 88 (1993). 
 61. WALDRON, supra note 33, at 218-223. 
 62. WALDRON, supra note 33, at 225. 
 63. See supra Part I.A. 
 64. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 51. 
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exercise her religious freedom is given a status that other ways of 
pursuing one’s beliefs are not given.65 
II.  RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Part I of this Article briefly looked at the history of political 
liberalism, starting (somewhat arbitrarily) with the figure of Locke as a 
proto-liberal and then discussing Rawls.  One version of that story 
viewed Locke as a weigh-station to Rawls, because Locke grasped 
correctly the idea of tolerance, but artificially restricted its scope to only 
faithful Christians, or perhaps to all religious believers generally, but left 
out atheists.  The contemporary political liberal, however, tends to see 
religion as one more comprehensive doctrine that is on par with other 
secular views of the world.  Of course, this means that religion, for the 
political liberal, is not to be disparaged more than other doctrines, nor 
considered privileged or “special” in a way that other doctrines are not.  
For the political liberal, both “free exercise” and “antiestablishment” 
extend beyond religion to the protection of every comprehensive 
doctrine, so long as they are, in Rawls’s master word, “reasonable.”66   
In this Part, the Article shifts away from high political theory and 
toward constitutional law, probing the extent to which one can read into 
the text of the First Amendment the sort of contemporary political 
liberalism described in the last Section.  The challenge here is both 
historical and theoretical, though this Part (and indeed the rest of the 
Article) stresses more the theoretical aspect.  Can we have a theory of 
the text and purpose of the First Amendment that coheres with the ideals 
of political liberalism, and not merely the proto-political liberalism of 
Locke?  This Part closely examines Eisgruber and Sager’s Religious 
Freedom and the Constitution.67  The effort by Eisgruber and Sager is 
the best effort by anyone to join the interpretation of the First 
Amendment with the ambitions of political liberalism, and to recognize 
that an interpretation of the First Amendment that privileges religion is a 
“constitutional mistake of sectarianism or partisanship.”68  This Part also 
attempts to extend and amplify Eisgruber and Sager’s argument in ways 
that they suggest but do not develop.  So, in the process, and in this Part, 
I try to make their argument stronger. 
 
 65. At least this will be the burden of Part III of this Article.   
 66. See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 48.   
 67. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5. 
 68. Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1291.   
FLANDERS - Final Edit - 26-2 3/3/2008  8:29 PM 
2008] A SECULAR FIRST AMENDMENT 271 
 
We should also be mindful, however, of the counter-narrative 
mentioned in Part I.  With Locke, we saw that his exclusion of atheists—
his effort, in his own way, to privilege religion and to give it a special 
status—was not done out of ignorance or indifference, but because he 
felt that religion is indeed special, deserves to be at the center of society,  
and is the basis for toleration in a way that atheism could never be.69  
The Lockean side of the politically liberal story finds its complement in 
our discussion of the American Constitution.  We might wish to make 
our Constitution one that embodies political liberal ideals, and one in 
which religious liberty stands not for the privileging of religion but 
rather for toleration simpliciter.70  As mentioned in Part I, if we agree 
substantively with these ideals, it might be positively a mistake to avoid 
fully reading them into the Constitution.  But in doing so, we might not 
simply be ignoring the text, which on its face seems to emphasize 
religion by giving it a status different from that of other ways of looking 
at the world.  We might be ignoring something of value that the 
Constitution is meant to protect, much in the same way that Locke, by 
excluding atheists, was commenting on political society rather than 
exhibiting a bias toward one comprehensive doctrine.  
A.  Eisgruber and Sager’s Religious Freedom and the Constitution 
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager’s recent book, 
Religious Freedom and the Constitution, is, in the end, a book that is 
deeply indebted to contemporary political liberalism.  As we saw above, 
Eisgruber and Sager, like Rawls, take as their task specifying the “fair 
terms of cooperation”71 between those who will disagree, and disagree 
profoundly, about religious matters.  Eisgruber and Sager summarize 
their motivations in their book’s concluding paragraph: 
For many Americans spiritual commitment and metaphysical truth matter 
enormously.  Surely we should be able to understand that the things that matter 
so deeply to us have their analogue in the very different beliefs, commitments, 
 
 69. See supra Part I.B.  
 70. See Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1315 (“At its core, religious liberty 
is about the toleration—the celebration—of the divergent ways that members of our society 
come to understand the foundational coordinates of a well-formed life.”).   
 71. This term belongs to Rawls.  See RAWLS, supra note 15, at xxvii.  
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and projects of others.  Justice and empathy alike ought to draw us toward fair 
terms of cooperation.72   
Eisgruber and Sager elsewhere make explicit their intent to read 
“[r]eligious liberty [as a] moral ideal [and] an important part of our 
understanding of political justice.”73  Even though this intent is not as 
explicit in their book, Eisgruber and Sager unmistakably develop an 
understanding of religious freedom that exists within the realm of 
political philosophy, and not just within the realm of constitutional law.   
Eisgruber and Sager, however, state that they are not merely 
theorizing out of the blue in the way that Rawls did;74 rather, they are 
offering an interpretation of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment.75  The fact that they claim to be laboring under this 
constraint makes their book at once very important and extremely 
strange.  It is important because, if successful, it shows us how the 
considerable theoretical resources of Rawlsian liberalism might be 
brought to bear on accommodating religious diversity.  Rawls, strangely, 
is not even mentioned in the book, despite the fact that his influence 
seems evident throughout.  This may only prove that, for lawyers and 
philosophers alike, Rawls is now part of the current climate of opinion. 
Eisgruber and Sager’s liberal attitude toward the constitutional 
status of religion is well captured in an example they give to prime our 
intuitions regarding religious liberty.  We can begin with this thought 
experiment that Eisgruber and Sager offer, and then move on to a more 
formulaic recitation of their position.  They have us imagine two “Ms. 
Campbells” who are neighbors, each running a soup kitchen out of her 
home.76  One is motivated by her religious beliefs, and the other is 
motivated out of a secular concern to help the less fortunate.77  It turns 
out, however, that a neutrally worded zoning ordinance prohibits the 
operation of a soup kitchen out of one’s home.78  The question Eisgruber 
and Sager pose is whether we should treat these two cases differently.  If 
our position is that religious motivations should be praised or given 
special protection, then we would treat the two cases differently, “the 
 
 72. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 285 (emphasis added).   
 73. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 1, at 590. 
 74. See supra Part I.A. 
 75. Rawls does seem to be offering an interpretation of the American liberal ethos, but 
he nowhere contends that he is interpreting the United States Constitution.   
 76. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 11, 54-55. 
 77. Id. at 11. 
 78. Id. 
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rights of the two Ms. Campbells, in other words, would vary according 
to the spiritual foundations of their beliefs.”79  Eisgruber and Sager take 
this result to be bizarre because, they reason, both Ms. Campbells should 
be treated equally.  To treat them differently based on their differing 
motivations “seems unjust on its face, and it also seems at odds with the 
essence of religious freedom in that such treatment imposes a test of 
religious orthodoxy as a condition of constitutional entitlement.”80 
The philosophical heart of Religious Freedom and the 
Constitution—the theory that justifies the same treatment of the two Ms. 
Campbells—is the principle that Eisgruber and Sager call “equal 
liberty.”81  It is in their defense of this principle that Eisgruber and 
Sager’s Rawlsian (and, more generally, politically liberal) roots become 
apparent.  The principle of equal liberty has two major parts that equally 
deflate any ambition of finding religion “special” enough to merit extra 
protection.  First, Eisgruber and Sager state that equal liberty means “no 
members of our political community ought to be devalued on account of 
the spiritual foundations of their important commitments and projects.”82  
The term “spiritual projects” is left deliberately vague here and 
elsewhere in the book, although Eisgruber and Sager offer an interesting 
and revealing gloss when they say, “[r]eligious faith [as opposed to 
“spiritual commitments”] receives special constitutional solicitude . . . 
but only because of its vulnerability to hostility and neglect.”83  The 
context of the passage seems to make clear that this “vulnerability” is 
one that is historical and contingent; in other words, Eisgruber and Sager 
give no privilege to religion based on its intrinsic “specialness” or worth, 
only due to its (traditional) susceptibility to abuse and disregard.84 
The second principle is even more deflationary of the religion 
clauses, if indeed it is directly relevant to religious freedom at all.  The 
second principle reads, “all members of our political community ought 
to enjoy rights of free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, 
and private property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor 
defined in terms of religion, will allow a broad range of religious beliefs 
and practices to flourish.”85   
 
 79. Id.  
 80. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 11.  See also id. at 54-55. 
 81. Id. at 4.   
 82. Id. at 4.   
 83. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 52. 
 84. Id.   
 85. Id. at 4. 
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Eisgruber and Sager seem to offer a third component to their 
principle of equal liberty.  Apart from religion’s historical vulnerability 
to “hostility and neglect,” they write, “we have no constitutional reason 
to treat religion as deserving special benefits or as subject to special 
disabilities.”86  This third component, however, merely reinforces their 
project of denying religion any special constitutional standing, and this 
project is evident from the second principle described above.   
We might get a better grip on Eisgruber and Sager’s position by 
considering how it could apply to free speech.  Does freedom of speech 
exist as an object of special constitutional solicitude, or does it exist 
merely because speech has historically been the subject of hostility and 
neglect?  The clear answer seems to be the former: freedom of speech 
exists as a separate constitutional value, one of intrinsic worth, protected 
as more than a prophylactic matter based on any historical hostility or 
neglect.  Consider how Eisgruber and Sager make this point explicitly: 
“Constitutional privileging [of free speech] requires as its justification an 
understanding that the activity in question brings with it some special 
virtue or priority in our political life.”87  By contrast, they see religion 
only as derivatively worthy of constitutional protection—if religion 
historically had not been neglected and abused, the constitutional 
principle would be unnecessary.  As Eisgruber and Sager state in an 
earlier article, “We need to abandon the idea that it is the unique value of 
religious practices that sometimes entitles them to constitutional 
attention.”88  Rather, “the only sound conception of religious liberty is 
founded upon protecting religious exercise against persecution, 
discrimination, insensitivity, or hostility.”89 
This standpoint, which denies any intrinsic uniqueness or 
“specialness” to religion, becomes clearest when Eisgruber and Sager 
essentially concede that their view renders the religion clauses redundant 
when compared with other parts of the Constitution:  
   Would it be a problem if the religion clauses turned out to be nothing 
more than specific versions of the more general norms included with the Equal 
Protection Clause?   
 
 86. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 87. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 4, at 448.    
 88. Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1248.   
 89. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and 
Religious Liberty After City of Borne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 104 (1997).   
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   Not at all. . . . It is entirely sensible to think of the religion clauses as 
one of the Constitution’s first encounters with concerns over the equal status of 
members of our political community.90 
According to Eisgruber and Sager, the principle of equal liberty 
receives its fullest expression in the Fourteenth Amendment 
(guaranteeing equal protection of the law)91 and the free speech clause of 
the First Amendment (guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression 
more broadly).92  It is in this light that we should interpret the religion 
clauses today. 
Eisgruber and Sager attempt to create a wholly secular First 
Amendment that, while not leaving religion entirely unprotected, ensures 
that religion does not receive any special protection.93  Religion is not 
“special” in the sense that it signifies something of separate 
constitutional value, such as free speech or even the right to bear arms.  
If we protect religious believers as much as, but no more than, those 
who have other broad “spiritual” beliefs, then we have satisfied equal 
liberty.  Again, this would allow temporary privileging of religion, given 
religion’s history of being abused and neglected.  It does not allow, 
however, any permanent privileging, as if religion deserves promotion or 
privilege based on its own merits.  If Eisgruber and Sager are correct, the 
Constitution, or at least the First Amendment, is wholly consistent with 
the philosophical doctrine of political liberalism. 
B.  An Objection (and Reply) to Eisgruber and Sager  
If we were approaching the problem of the two Ms. Campbells 
from a purely theoretical (Rawlsian) standpoint, Eisgruber and Sager’s 
sentiment would be fitting, viz. that favoring religious over non-religious 
motivations would be “unjust.”94  But this, of course, is not the baseline, 
at least if we believe Eisgruber and Sager in their stated project.  They 
are trying to give us an interpretation of the religion clauses in the First 
Amendment, so they are at least nominally constrained by that text.  The 
text, however, does not speak in terms of what is just or unjust on its 
face, but apparently carves out a special place for religion.  This is 
 
 90.  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 70. 
 91. See Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1297 (“As we flesh out the idea of 
equal regard, it may seem to resemble a robust jurisprudence of equal protection.”).   
 92. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 70.   
 93. Id. at 13.  
 94. See supra Part I.A. 
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precisely what requires an explanation because it can seem especially 
problematic for the Rawlsian.  Why is religion special, as opposed to 
other comprehensive visions of the good life (or even non-
comprehensive ones)?  This is the unique challenge that presents itself to 
the constitutional scholar as opposed to the theoretician.   
Let us consider the “simple textual” point that the Constitution 
seems to privilege religion by virtue of the fact that the First Amendment 
contains the word “religion” rather than a vague term or phrase like 
“freedom of conscience.”  If the idea was really equal liberty, then why 
is the word “religion” used at all?  Even if this simple textual point is not 
dispositive of Eisgruber and Sager, it still provides a presumption and 
starting point to argue against Eisgruber and Sager.  As George Freeman 
stated in an article predating Eisgruber and Sager’s major articles, “any 
argument for treating the believer and the nonbeliever equally under the 
religion clauses must be accompanied by an argument for why the 
Founders’ views on the subject should be ignored.”95  For Freeman, the 
Founders’ views are especially disclosed by their choice of protecting 
religion over protecting freedom of conscience.96 
Eisgruber and Sager have a response to this objection, but it is 
unsatisfactory.  They write that their favored principle of “equal liberty” 
is not itself written into the Constitution.97  This does not matter, 
however, because they are no better or worse off than “other theorists 
who are trying to interpret the religion clauses.  The First Amendment 
does not say ‘separation of church and state,’ for example.  Nor does it 
say ‘neutrality’ or ‘compelling state interest.’”98  This is a weak reply.  
The terms that Eisgruber and Sager cite are not in the Constitution, but 
are terms used when explicating the special importance of religion, for 
instance in separating church from state, or in framing the balance 
between the independent value of religion and state interests 
(“neutrality” and “compelling state interest” can also be understood in 
this way).99  Eisgruber and Sager deny that religion has any special 
importance, and this is a different burden than the one carried by those 
who seek to interpret religion in the First Amendment. 
 
 95. George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 
“Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1524 (1983). 
 96. Id. at 1522.   
 97. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 68. 
 98. Id.     
 99. Id.   
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Eisgruber and Sager can reframe their point in a way that makes it 
more compelling.  They correctly point out that history can never be 
entirely decisive in matters of constitutional interpretation.100  After 
discussing the work of Michael McConnell, they write of commentators 
who insist on following the text and history wherever it leads.101  
Eisgruber and Sager suspect that these commentators’ “normative 
convictions are doing the real work here—that their interpretation of 
ambiguous text and multivocal history depends on, rather than 
constrains, their convictions about what counts as a satisfactory 
conception of religious freedom.”102  In short, even with history on either 
side, we must make an interpretive decision.   
With this in mind, let us return to the example of the Founders’ 
choice to protect “religion” instead of “freedom of conscience.”  There is 
one piece of evidence that favors treating religion as a special 
constitutional category.  In drafting the First Amendment, the Founders 
had a choice between protecting religion and protecting religion along 
with the exercise of conscience.103  If the Founders had chosen the latter, 
one could meritoriously argue that religion is not per se special, but is 
just one example of the broader category of exercises of conscience.  
Furthermore, we might also agree with Eisgruber and Sager that religion 
should be treated equally with other “conscientious” efforts made by 
citizens (which would, presumably, include even secular acts of 
conscience).  The Founders, however, rejected this phrasing, so it 
follows that Eisgruber and Sager are incorrect in slighting religion. 
This is, however, far too quick of an argument to conclude that 
Eisgruber and Sager are wrong (even though their casualness with the 
history of the Amendment might lead us to jump to such a conclusion).  
It is unclear which way the choice of one phrasing cuts when compared 
to other possible choices by the Framers.  Perhaps they felt that 
“religion” was an adequately capacious term to include acts of 
conscience made by citizens.  On the other hand, they might have 
thought that all exercises of conscience were religious, so that the 
 
 100. Id. at 73. 
 101. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 73.   
 102. Id.   
 103. For a thorough discussion of the Congressional debate over framing the First 
Amendment, see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: THE ATTACK ON 
AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at ch. 3) 
(on file with author).  Nussbaum concludes, “it seems clear . . . that the text the framers chose 
does make religion special for the purposes of the free exercise clause, fair or unfair.”  Id. 
(manuscript at 30).   
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inclusion of “acts of conscience” in the First Amendment would be 
redundant.  It seems that both of these readings are plausible construals 
of the choice made by the Founders in crafting the First Amendment.  In 
sum, the text underdetermines the best interpretation that we might have 
expected, given the nature of the concept of “religion.”  Or, as Eisgruber 
and Sager put it, “[t]he text of the Constitution is seldom if ever 
dispositive of interesting constitutional questions.  Neither is the history.  
It is conceptually impossible that the complex social and legal events 
surrounding the founding could answer hard questions without a 
normative view to guide the interpretive enterprise.”104 
At this point, we need more than history to decide the debate.  In 
fact, we need a theory of interpretation,105 a way of thinking about the 
interpretation of religion that might help us develop a better sense of 
which possibility is more consistent with the text and meaning of the 
Constitution: the idea that religion is not special or that religion has 
some special constitutional status.  The fact that the First Amendment 
actually singles out religious belief as deserving of special protection 
speaks strongly in favor of the “specialness” of religion.  The text here 
functions, however, as a weak constraint rather than an absolute one.  It 
is not obvious that this is the best reading of constitutional text, if we 
think that the best reading is one that aligns the Constitution with the 
ambitions of political liberalism.  Again, to settle this, we need a theory. 
 One theory of religion’s place in the First Amendment, as we 
have seen, is that religion deserves special consideration because of its 
history, viz. that it has been the historical object of abuse and neglect.106  
This is the prophylactic theory, which sees nothing special about 
religion, but recognizes that it has been historically targeted for 
particular sanctions or impositions.107  As a result, it singles out 
“religion” as an area of special concern.  This is the theory that, at most, 
Eisgruber and Sager are willing to embrace vis-à-vis religion.   
Religion’s claim to equal regard is not a claim for privilege but rather for 
protection: constitutional concern is prompted by vulnerability of some 
religious believers to unfair and damaging forms of discrimination, not the 
 
 104. Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1270.   
 105. This is scarcely the place to give a fully worked out theory of constitutional 
interpretation, nor is it clear that we really need one to get a better grip on the religion clauses.   
 106. See supra Parts I and II.A. 
 107. See supra Parts I and II.A. 
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perception that religious motivation is more noble or deserving than the other 
serious pursuits in life.108   
The prophylactic theory is attractive and would be worth embracing 
but for the fact that it does not quite explain why religion is singled out 
in the Constitution.  In fact, this theory has a hard time fitting religion 
with the other values protected in the First Amendment.  No one, as I 
offered above, should say that we protect free speech only because 
people have historically been tempted to suppress speech; we would 
assume (I think rightly) that speech has some independent value that the 
Framers sought to protect.  We should only rest content with the 
prophylactic theory if in the end nothing makes sense of what I have 
been calling the “constitutional value” of religion. 
There is an explanation of the term “religion” in the First 
Amendment that is better than the prophylactic theory, yet is still 
consistent with Eisgruber and Sager’s broader theory of religious liberty.  
This explanation, call it the “moral reading” of the religion clauses, 
looks for the aspect of religion that best captures the moral value of 
religion.109  The Framers likely viewed “religion” as coextensive with 
theism.110  Today, however, we have come to understand “religion” 
more expansively, recognizing that it includes non-theistic faiths.111  But 
in fact, the best understanding of religion’s value is to see it as including 
even non-religious ways of life.  The value of having a “religion,” in 
other words, is simply the value of having a “comprehensive” view of 
the world, in the sense of having a picture of the world that “includes 
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal 
character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational 
relationships.”112 
The burden of the moral reading is to show that the value of 
“religion” is captured not merely by theistic religions and their close 
 
 108. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 4, at 449 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  See also William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 325 (1991) (“That the text of the First Amendment explicitly 
references religion and not other belief systems does not support the conclusion that religion is 
the preferred value.  Rather, the explicit reference to religion reflects the fact that religious 
groups had often been persecuted and therefore needed special protection.”).      
 109. See infra Part II.C.   
 110. See DAVID C. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2006); see also 
JOHN MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF 
A NATION (2007).    
 111. See infra Part II.C.   
 112. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 13.   
FLANDERS - Final Edit - 26-2 3/3/2008  8:29 PM 
280 Q L R  [Vol. 26:257 
 
analogues, but is in fact present in every comprehensive doctrine. If this 
can be done, then we have a convincing account of religious freedom 
that, while extending to other doctrines not explicitly religious, does not 
depart from or deny the force of the constitutional text.  It only argues 
that the best reading of that text points to an expansive reading of the 
word “religion.”  But if this is the case, it also shows how the simple 
textual argument may be strengthened beyond the point at which the 
word religion figures in the First Amendment, and not freedom of 
conscience.  The claim of the simple textualist, now really a moralist, is 
that religion’s special value belongs to a narrower class than that 
captured by the value of having a comprehensive doctrine.  The burden 
on the texualist/moralist is to distinguish the value of religious 
comprehensive doctrines from secular ones. 
The plan for the remainder of Part II is as follows.  Section C 
elaborates on the methodology of the “moral reading” of the 
Constitution, with special reference to the work of Ronald Dworkin.113  
Section D applies this methodology to the religion clauses, and discusses 
the work of Andrew Koppelman, who I think offers a moral reading of 
the religion clauses without explicitly saying so.  In these two Sections, I 
hope to achieve something that Eisgruber and Sager promise, but 
ultimately do not deliver: a reading of the Constitution that is not only 
plausible and coherent, and consistent with the text, but also shows that 
our best understanding of religion does not give any special status to 
practices traditionally deemed “religious.”  Part III of this Article will 
then argue that, indeed, we do err when we deny the “specialness” of 
religion. 
C.  The Moral Reading of the Constitution 
In the previous Section, I agreed with Eisgruber and Sager’s 
implicit slighting of constitutional history in interpreting the religion 
clauses of the amendments.  I also began sketching an argument for 
Eisgruber and Sager that justifies placing religion on par with the 
comprehensive doctrine.  Again, we can construe religion broadly to 
understand it as encompassing both secular and religious ways of life.  
But I stopped short of fully endorsing this argument because we need a 
theory of constitutional interpretation to underwrite this move.  It is not 
 
 113. Eisgruber and Sager indicate their sympathy with Dworkin’s methods in 
Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1270 n.40.   
FLANDERS - Final Edit - 26-2 3/3/2008  8:29 PM 
2008] A SECULAR FIRST AMENDMENT 281 
 
enough to assert that religion might be interpreted in a way that makes 
the First Amendment consistent with the ideals of political liberalism; 
we need a theory supporting that this is the best way of interpreting the 
First Amendment.  We need a theory because, I think, we cannot look to 
history alone to decide the matter.  As I suggested in my example of 
“rights of conscience,”114 history tends to underdetermine which 
interpretation is the best interpretation of a text.  This Section makes a 
brief excursus into theory; it is enough, I hope, to show why some 
attempts at defining religion are not simply mistaken, but misguided. 
The theory I propose is a version of Ronald Dworkin’s “moral 
reading” of the Constitution,115 which resembles a theory that 
Christopher Eisgruber has also offered.116  For the sake of simplicity and 
clarity, I will use Dworkin’s theory primarily and make occasional 
reference to Eisgruber.  According to Dworkin’s method of 
interpretation, we can look at the Constitution as a document containing 
both particular instructions and statements that are more abstract.117  
When it comes to particular instructions, such as the Third 
Amendment’s ban on quartering soldiers,118 very little interpretation is 
required.119  The text gives very specific instructions, and we are bound 
(insofar as we are bound by the text at all) to follow them.120 
Things are very different when we come to the more abstract 
clauses of the Constitution, such as those guaranteeing free speech or the 
equal protection of the laws.  According to Dworkin, we cannot read 
these clauses merely as instructions directing us to a particular action or 
result.  They speak more broadly, and they speak beyond the intentions 
of the Framers of those particular amendments, those who chose the 
particular words and phrases of those clauses.121  Or, to put it a different 
way, those amendments should be read as if the Founders had purposely 
chosen broad and abstract language with the goal that their particular 
intentions and understanding would give way to future, better 
understanding.  They did not intend to embody their ideas of due 
 
 114. See supra Part II.B. 
 115. I rely most directly on DWORKIN, supra note 13.   
 116. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).   
 117. See especially the introduction to DWORKIN, supra note 13.   
 118. This is Dworkin’s example, see id at 8.   
 119. It is an interesting question—far outside of the scope of this Article—of how we 
decide when a text should be given a moral reading, and when we should give it a much more 
straightforward, literal reading.   
 120. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 8.   
 121. Id. at 8-9.   
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process, equality, or free speech, but instead the best ideas that we could 
come up with, consistent with the text and our own unique history. 
The above method of interpretation does not work without 
constraint—we are still bound by the historical interpretation of the 
document and by the plain words of the document itself.  As Eisgruber 
usefully puts this point, “the Constitution requires Supreme Court 
justices to construct the American people’s best judgment about justice; 
either philosophical argument or historical reflection might aid that 
task . . . .”122  In a similar vein, Ronald Dworkin says that judges should 
be bound not only by considerations of value (asking, for example, how 
one can interpret an amendment to best capture the value that lies behind 
it), but also by considerations of “fit,” that is, how well the interpretation 
fits with the text and with the past history of interpreting the relevant 
word or phrase.123 
What I urge in the next Section and in Part III is that such a moral 
interpretation of the Constitution should also apply when we look to the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment.  This may seem peculiar, but 
only if we ignore how religion is inherently a normative term, something 
I discuss in more detail in the next Part.  Statements about protecting the 
free exercise of religion and avoiding religious establishment are 
certainly different from bans on quartering soldiers.  But does this 
difference place religion on par with equal protection or due process?  I 
maintain that it does, but I can only discharge this burden by showing 
that religion is best seen as a value term, rather than simply a descriptive 
one.  As a preliminary observation, we can see that “religion” surely 
shares with terms such as “due process” and “equal protection” a level of 
abstraction that a ban on quartering of soldiers lacks.  It would be 
wrong, at least to a first approximation, simply to read the religion 
clauses as if they were protecting religion, in the same way that we read 
the word “soldier” or “quartering.”  Although this is a possible reading, 
it is not the most compelling one, and it is not the one that we should 
accept. 
It is important to see what follows from a moral reading of the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment, in the same way that free 
 
 122. EISGRUBER, supra note 116, at 8.  Eisgruber goes on to say that whether justices use 
historical argument or philosophical theory, “which works best is probably a matter of 
personal style and preference.”  Id.  He allows that history will sometimes be useful; more 
important, however, he articulates the broader constraint that the interpretation of the text 
should seek to embody the “people’s best judgment” about what justice requires.  Id. 
 123. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, ch. 7 (1986).   
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speech or equal protection could be given a moral reading.  It follows 
that certain attempts to define “religion” descriptively are misguided, if 
not altogether unhelpful.  For example, Kent Greenawalt’s proposal to 
look at religion “analogically” does not get us very far, unless it also 
tells us what is of value in all of those indisputable instances of 
religion.124  Similarly, Eduardo Peñalver’s suggestion that we look at 
religion as an “evolving” concept, relying on ordinary language, is less 
than satisfactory.125  Again, this will not be useful according to the moral 
reading, unless we also see the value that is preserved as religion 
“evolves” over time.  Of course, it simply may be impossible to identify 
religion analogically, or by looking at ordinary language, without 
appeals to value.  That is, it may be impossible to “pick out” that which 
is religious unless we are also working—implicitly or explicitly—with a 
conception of what is valuable about religion.  Although this conception 
is likely present, what the moral reading puts to the fore is not merely 
the inevitability of appeals to value, but their primacy in picking out the 
proper meaning of religion.126 
The next Section defends Eisgruber and Sager by arguing that the 
best interpretation of religion is one that does not view religion as 
involving certain practices of worship or belief in a deity, but simply 
views religion as coextensive with what Rawls means by a 
“comprehensive doctrine.”127  If such an argument is successful, it would 
show—in a way that Eisgruber and Sager do not show in an especially 
effective way, if at all—that the best interpretation of the First 
Amendment is one that is consistent with the theory of contemporary 
political liberalism.  That this argument is not entirely persuasive is the 
burden of Part III, which suggests an alternative to the moral reading 
that interprets religion in the same manner as the comprehensive 
doctrine. 
 
 124. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 
753, 762 (1984) (defending the view that religion is not a concept that can be defined directly, 
but only analogously, by beginning with established cases of religious belief).   
 125. Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 810 (1997) 
(arguing that religion is a concept that evolves through time).   
 126. John Finnis puts religion as “one of the basic human values,” and so comes closest 
to the approach I am advocating here.  See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS 89 (1980).   
 127. Eisgruber and Sager at one point contemplate this move, but then go on to reject it, 
calling it a “definitional gambit.”  See Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1270.   
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D.  The Moral Reading of the Religion Clauses 
This Section begins by constructing a defense for Eisgruber and 
Sager’s implicit view that “religion” is no more or less worthy of 
protection than any other comprehensive doctrine—accomplished by 
reading “religion” in the First Amendment as broadly as possible—by 
looking first at a case in which the problem of defining religion is 
especially salient.  This case, known as one of the “draft” cases in the 
leading casebook,128 highlights how the line between religion and 
irreligion is becoming exceedingly hard to draw.  This case shows, 
internally, that the concept of religion may be inherently problematic: it 
is fuzzy around the edges, so that any definition of religion may have to 
be extended to cover some cases where it may not be immediately 
obvious that the conduct in question is “religious.”  This idea will lead 
us toward the argument that the category of religion should be 
broadened, but it does not get us all the way there.  The claim that the 
category of religion is fuzzy does not get us to the claim that “religion” 
is best interpreted as meaning “comprehensive doctrine.”  It stays at the 
level of a description.  For, if we are to go along with the “moral 
reading” of the Constitution, we still have to show that the value of 
religion is best captured by this expansive reading.  A draft case will also 
provide us with some guidance on this point. 
The case, United States v. Seeger,129 deals not with an explication 
of the Constitution, but of a statute involving the right of conscientious 
objection.  The statute provided an exemption for those who, because of 
their “religious training and belief,” were opposed to war.130  The statute 
went on to define “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s 
belief in a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation,” but not including “essentially political, 
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”131  
The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff’s “religious” belief, given 
that it did not involve a Supreme Being, qualified him for the exemption.  
The Supreme Court held that it did qualify him for the exemption.132  
Even though a statute was at issue rather than the Constitution’s religion 
 
 128. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 870 (2002). 
 129. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 130. Id. at 165. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 163. 
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clauses, the Court began to develop a concept of “religion” expansive 
enough to include people’s comprehensive doctrines, and not narrowly 
construed to their religious beliefs. 
Seeger shows us two things.  First, it reveals the possibility of an 
arguably “liminal” case in which, according to the Court, there is a 
sincere belief that casts itself in spiritual terms.  At the same time, the 
content of the plaintiff’s belief did not contain any reference to a 
Supreme Being.133  The Court was faced with deciding whether a belief 
of such intensity and sincerity rose to the level of religion, and was thus 
a legitimate reason to exempt the plaintiff from fighting in wars.  One 
can understand the Court’s reluctance to draw a line that would exclude 
the plaintiff from the exemption; such a holding would seem on its face 
unfair to the plaintiff in Seeger, denigrating the sincerity and intensity of 
his beliefs, even if they do not fit perfectly within the statute.  The Court 
could have held that the plaintiff’s belief was not religious, but still 
deserved to be classified under the statute anyway.  Instead, the Court 
determined that his belief should be considered religious.  The Court was 
on its way to extending the traditional concept of religion so that it 
would not have to encompass a belief in a Supreme Being.  What 
follows is “the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious 
community.”134 
The Court did more; it insisted on the value of giving the plaintiff 
in Seeger the exemption.  It is not that this was merely a close case or 
that it would have been churlish to not extend the exemption to the 
plaintiff given how near he was to traditional religious belief.  In fact, it 
is arguable that he was not at all near traditional religious belief.  The 
Court makes a point of saying that religious belief should be construed 
broadly.  But it does this in terms which make clear that beliefs, other 
than religious beliefs, have real value, and that there is value in a sincere 
and intense commitment which does not refer to a Supreme Being.135  
The Court finds this value by referring to the works of Paul Tillich.  The 
majority quotes Tillich as saying that one does not need to use the word 
“God” to indicate a deep spiritual dimension to her life, all one needs to 
do is “translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of 
your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without 
 
 133. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66. 
 134. Id. at 180. 
 135. Id. at 187. 
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any reservation.”136  For the majority in Seeger, the value of religion is 
the value of having deep commitments of this sort.  This is both a 
description of what the majority takes to be the proper extension of the 
term religion, and an implicit understanding of what makes religion 
valuable. 
This approach to identifying the value of religion is similar to the 
one recently proposed by Andrew Koppelman.137  Kopppelman, 
borrowing from the work of Charles Taylor, states that “religion” in this 
broad sense involves “strong evaluation”—evaluations dealing in right 
or wrong, higher and lower—and typically will involve reference to a 
“hypergood.”138  A “hypergood,” Koppelman explains, again glossing 
the work of Charles Taylor, is shorthand for a “higher good,” one that 
will normally trump lower goods.139  Such hypergoods can be religious, 
such as service to God, but they can also involve secular ends, such as 
benevolence and respect.140  In Koppelman’s telling, belief in a 
“hypergood” resembles an “ultimate concern,” and, therefore, deserves 
protection under the religion clauses of the First Amendment.141  
Essentially, if one is passionately and sincerely devoted to something 
“higher” that, in some moments at least, can trump other worldly 
matters, the state should do its best to respect that devotion and to avoid 
interfering with it.  The state is also obliged to avoid substituting its 
favored candidate for a hypergood, to avoid imposing it upon others 
coercively, or even to prefer it.  
Koppelman, incidentally, offers the hypergood analysis as a way of 
cashing out Eisgruber and Sager’s theory of religious accommodation.142  
But, in fact, Koppelman’s reconstruction is better than that of Eisgruber 
and Sager.  Eisgruber and Sager were not afraid of the implication that 
their reading of the religion clauses made the First Amendment 
redundant with other protections of the Constitution.  With Koppelman’s 
interpretation and the interpretation of the Seeger Court, however, we 
 
 136. Id. (quoting PAUL TILLICH, SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)).  Cf. Note, 
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978) (urging a 
functional definition of religion which involves each person’s “ultimate concern”).     
 137. See especially Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571 (2006). 
 138. Id. at 588, 594.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF 
THE MODERN IDENTITY 4 (1989). 
 139. Koppelman, supra note 137, at 594. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 583.   
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can say that the First Amendment religion clauses protect intense 
devotion to ideals, “deep commitments,”143 and this does not necessarily 
overlap with guarantees found elsewhere in the Constitution.  It does not 
overlap, for instance, with the guarantees of freedom of expression or 
association because these things do not necessarily require devotion to 
ideals, or a comprehensive doctrine.  We can be protected in our 
expression even if what we say is vulgar (so long as it is not obscene).  
Our associations may be free-floating, temporary, and not for the 
promotion of any “higher good.”   
In short, Seeger shows that, by looking at cases at the boundary of 
what it means to be religious, we will find something of value.  This 
value is worth protecting in the religion clauses, and it justifies treating 
“religion” as special.  It would be unfair to exclude those beliefs and 
belief systems that have this special value (passionate devotion to an 
ideal) from the protection we give religion, as the term is traditionally 
understood.  We may not be strictly following the text of the 
Constitution, but this method provides the best way of interpreting the 
text.  And the best way is achieved when the ideals of the Constitution 
match the ideals of our best political theory, viz. contemporary political 
liberalism.  As Eisgruber and Sager conclude their book, “[s]urely we 
should be able to understand that the things that matter so deeply to us 
have their analogue in the very different beliefs, commitments, and 
projects of others.”144  My interpretation of the religion clauses offered 
in this Part allows us to reconcile this theoretical ambition with the 
words of the Constitution.   
It is helpful to contrast the argument for interpreting religion in this 
deflationary way (so that there is nothing necessarily special about 
“religion” which makes it deserving of heightened protection), with an 
argument that Brian Leiter has recently presented.145  Leiter searches for 
some rationale, based on some special feature of religion (i.e., that 
religion depends on faith to reach its conclusions), to tolerate religion.  
Leiter finds no distinguishing feature of religion, so he concludes that 
the case for toleration of religion is the same as the case for toleration 
 
 143. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 4, at 452.  Eisgruber and Sager’s 
use of the term “deep commitments” suggests that sometimes they are in agreement with 
Koppelman on this point; at other points, however, Eisgruber and Sager analogize religion to 
disability: deserving of special protection, but not necessarily intrinsically valuable or in any 
sense “deep.”     
 144. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 285.   
 145. Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Winter 
2008), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012910. 
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more generally.146  This conclusion fits with the argument I have given 
in this Part.147  There is nothing unique about religion that separates it 
from other comprehensive doctrines.  It follows that our reason for 
tolerating religion is the same as our reason for tolerating other 
comprehensive doctrines: they are exercises of the human capacity for 
choice, and they represent an ordering of values and preferences.  The 
best way to read the Constitution is to see it as protecting peoples’ free 
exercise of their comprehensive doctrines, rather than their free exercise 
of religion.  So too, we might say, that the liberal state should not 
establish any one comprehensive doctrine, rather than simply refraining 
from establishing a religion. 
III. THE MEANING OF RELIGION 
Part II argued that “religion” might apply, on the best interpretation 
of the constitutional text, to those things for which people have a 
passionate commitment, “higher” things, but not necessarily religious 
things.  These commitments roughly correspond to Rawls’s 
understanding of the “comprehensive doctrine.”  In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls defines the “comprehensive doctrine” as including “conceptions 
of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as 
well as ideals of friendship and of familiar and associational 
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the 
limit to our life as a whole.”148  Such a doctrine roughly corresponds to 
Paul Tillich’s notion of an “ultimate concern,” and which the Seeger 
Court identified as the essence of religion.149  The terms do not overlap 
completely, but there is at least a familial resemblance between all of 
them, to employ the Wittgensteinian idiom.150 
This Part offers the beginnings of an alternative account of the 
value of religion, one which is narrower than the Seeger/Koppelman 
definition but which is still rather broad.  It does a better job of capturing 
the value of religious belief, and indicates why a state might want to give 
special protection to religious belief, rather than simply to those ideals to 
which we are passionately committed, whether these ideals are secular 
 
 146. Id. (manuscript at 32-33, on file with author). 
 147. See supra Part II.D. 
 148. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 13.   
 149. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965) (quoting 2 PAUL TILLICH, 
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).   
 150. See Greenawalt, supra note 124, at 762-64 (using Wittgenstein as the basis for his 
“analogical” proposal).   
FLANDERS - Final Edit - 26-2 3/3/2008  8:29 PM 
2008] A SECULAR FIRST AMENDMENT 289 
 
or religious.  To be sure, and acknowledging one of the points from 
Seeger, there will be “hard calls” and borderline cases.  But there is a 
difference between allowing borderline cases to transform our 
understanding of the core of religion (as arguably the Seeger Court 
proceeded), and establishing a clear “core,” and then going on to deem 
some borderline cases “religious”—not because they are genuinely 
religious, but because to do otherwise might be unfair.  In any case, line-
drawing issues are unavoidable, even if we draw the line as broadly as 
the Seeger Court did.  Thus, Eisgruber and Sager are mistaken when 
they suggest avoiding a model of the religion clauses that requires us to 
“categorize” religion.151  Such categorization is inevitable, so we should 
rather take care to ensure that we have the right categorization (i.e., the 
one that best captures the value of religion). 
I divide the value of religion into two components that are not 
strictly separable, but can be kept analytically distinct.  The first 
component goes to the fact that religion requires obedience to a higher 
authority; in other words, religion shows believers (and people in 
general) that they are accountable to a non-temporal judge, and that there 
may be extra-temporal consequences to their actions.  This shows us, to 
a first approximation, why it might be valuable to protect religious belief 
and practice, namely because we do not want to force a conflict in the 
believer between her secular loyalty and her religious loyalty.  The state 
should avoid forcing such a choice as far as possible. 
But this point only goes to why the state should protect religion.  It 
looks to the value of protecting religion, rather than directly to the value 
of religion itself.  Why is allegiance to a religious “higher authority” 
valuable in itself, prompting us to avoid forcing believers to choose 
between loyalties?  This is the second component of the value of 
religion, one that says directly why religion is valuable, as opposed to 
why it is something that the state should protect.  Here, it is essential to 
“categorize” and to get at the “basis of the substance and structure” of 
religious belief, which Eisgruber and Sager caution against.152  The 
answer, which I try to develop, but only in a cursory way, has some 
resonance with Taylor’s (and Koppelman’s) idea of a hypergood, but 
goes beyond that idea.  It is the idea that the religious viewpoint 
 
 151. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 55.  At the same time, as I concede later, the 
limited competence of courts may lead us to categorize religion broadly rather than narrowly.  
But this has its costs as well, as I urge in my conclusion.   
 152. Id.   
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encourages us to see life itself (rather than the particular goods within 
our lives) as a “gift”; it is this viewpoint that makes religion distinctive. 
A.  The Problem of Scope 
Before getting to my explication of the value of religion, however, 
we first must confront a question that we did not squarely confront in 
Part II, where I argued that “religion” might best be understood as 
coextensive with Rawls’s idea of a “comprehensive doctrine.”153  This is 
the question of scope.  In Part II, I bracketed the problem of scope, 
because the goal, it seemed, was simply to extend the scope of the term 
“religion” as far as possible: we wanted, somehow, to extend religion to 
include secular conceptions of what makes life worth living.  But even 
there, in providing that account, we ran into the problem of scope.  We 
did not broaden religion so that it included any of one’s preferences.  
Rather, we restricted it to those preferences that are of one’s “ultimate 
concern,” and argued that these commitments sufficiently capture the 
value of religion.   
In the definition I am about to offer, however, the problem of scope 
is even more evident.  If religion is limited to simply those things which 
are religious, in a sense more narrow than a conception of the good, we 
might ask: why not restrict the value of religion to the value of simply 
one religion?  For instance, why not restrict “religion” to only 
Christianity?  One might be tempted to answer this with a recourse to 
history, arguing that the Founders never intended for “religion” in the 
First Amendment to have such narrow meaning.  If the Founders wanted 
to refer to Christianity only, they would have put free exercise of 
“Christianity” in the First Amendment, rather than the catch-all term 
“religion.”  But we know this argument has its limits.  We are looking 
for the morally best construal of religion, and this will dictate, at least in 
part, the proper scope.  It is thus an open question of whether the best 
reading of “religion” is one religion. 
In Tom Jones, the character Parson Thwackum said, “[w]hen I 
mention religion, . . . I mean the Christian religion; and not only the 
Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant 
religion, but the Church of England.”154  For Thwackum, the value of 
 
 153. See supra Part II.B. 
 154. Paul Griffiths, The Very Idea of Religion, FIRST THINGS, May 2000, at 30, 31 
(quoting HENRY FIELDING, TOM JONES, A FOUNDLING (1749), and defending Parson 
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religion is in the value of one particular religion, and, not to put too fine 
a point on it, the true religion.  It is certainly a valid claim that the value 
of religion is the value of the true religion.155  Or, to put it another way, 
the proper scope of the term “religion” is the one true religion. 
We should resist this reading, while at the same time acknowledge 
that it has some significance.  It is correct in treating religion as a 
normative term, one that we can only define with reference to its value.  
Where this reading goes wrong, however, is treating value as only true 
value, or in other words, that the only value in religion is to be found in 
the true religion.  Still, this is a serious position, and we can only rebut it 
by showing that the value of religion can be found even in religious 
practices and beliefs that are not true.  And we have to do this while 
marking the scope of religion as something less than simply one’s 
ultimate commitments.  Either way, we miss something of value.  If we 
define religion too narrowly, we miss the value of even false religious 
commitments; and if we define religion too broadly, we risk missing 
what is unique and uniquely valuable about religion, thus giving religion 
a value that is not true to its nature.156 
B.  The Value of Religion: Obedience to a Higher Sovereign 
Conceptualizing the “value of religion” can begin with the familiar 
idea that believers in a religion are members of two kingdoms: 
conventionally understood as the heavenly kingdom and the earthly 
kingdom.  It follows then that a central problem for such believers is 
determining how to negotiate the demands of the two kingdoms when 
they conflict.  Of course, there are various ways to deal with this 
problem.  One might think that the demands of the heavenly kingdom 
always correspond to what the earthly kingdom demands—thus one is 
 
Thwackum’s view of religion).  See also CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, NATURAL LAW LIBERALISM 
218-19 (2006) (sympathetic discussion of Griffiths).      
 155. See especially Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and 
Impossibility of a Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35 
(1998).  Parson Thwackum’s view might have been shared by Joseph Story.   See Thomas B. 
Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?  Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and 
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1133 (2006) (quoting Story 
as saying, “the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought 
to receive encouragement from the state”).   
 156. The same thing, I think, would apply to interpreting the value of religion as only 
encompassing theistic religions, as Justice Scalia has recently suggested in the establishment 
context.  This, again, makes the circle too small.  For a discussion of Scalia’s position, see 
Colby, supra note 155.   
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relieved of any tension between the two positions, because the 
commands of one kingdom simply collapse into the commands of the 
other.  Or, by contrast, one could simply always uphold the commands 
of the heavenly kingdom, disregarding the commands of the earthly 
kingdom.  But in all likelihood, there will be some tension between the 
two kingdoms.  Which kingdom one should obey in any given 
circumstance is an open question; sometimes, it will be a matter of 
following different commands in different areas of life. 
One can already see, here, why the state might be interested in 
giving the believer freedom to negotiate these conflicting demands.  On 
its face, it seems to be a simple matter of prudence.  If one’s state has 
citizens of this type, then one would not want to put them repeatedly in 
the position of having to choose between loyalties.  One would want to 
try, as best as possible, to secure a domain in which she can practice her 
religion unimpeded, unhindered by the state’s demands.  Of course, one 
cannot always eliminate conflict, but she can reduce it.  The position of 
the state in this case would be, as Michael McConnell has put it, to come 
as close as possible to a “world in which individuals make decisions 
about religion on the basis of their own religious conscience, without the 
influence of government.”157  Again, this will always be an imperfect 
accommodation, with the government and the believer constantly having 
to renegotiate the proper boundaries. 
However, we are looking for more than simply a good, prudential 
reason for the state to protect religion.158  We are looking for the value of 
religion.  And in the idea that religion’s obligations are commands, 
obligations from the sovereign of another kingdom, we can find some 
understanding of the value in protecting religion.  Religious commands, 
insofar as they are commands, can have an “imperatival” force—that is, 
they can make a claim on the believer that overrides or trumps all of her 
other earthly concerns.  Religious obligations make a claim on the 
believer, and the state should respect even the erring conscience in what 
it seeks out, because it is believed to come from a higher source of 
authority.  The state should not confront, without good reason, the 
 
 157. Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 
169 (1992).   
 158. Eisgruber and Sager are correct to note that we might protect religion without 
necessarily valuing it; this, I think, is what the prudential argument does.  We might want to 
avoid conflicts between the state and citizens’ deepest beliefs.  We might view this protection 
using an analogy to physical disability: we want to accommodate people’s disabilities, but this 
does not imply necessarily that we value people having certain disabilities.  See Vulnerability 
of Conscience, supra note 4, at 1267.   
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believer on these grounds, not because the state does not want to anger 
the believer, but because the state respects the believer’s conscience. 
This is where Michael McConnell, for instance, finds the strongest 
ground for the believer to claim special protection.  In McConnell’s 
words, religious freedom is special because “no other freedom is a duty 
to a higher authority”;159 or, as William P. Marshall summarizes the 
argument, “humanity’s relationship with God should be understood to 
transcend all other allegiances or activities.”160  But I confess, following 
Koppelman, that this sketch of religion does not uniquely single out 
what is most valuable in religion.161  Conflicts between conscience and 
religion can certainly occur outside “religion” as it is traditionally 
conceived, and so McConnell’s insistence that religion (as traditionally 
conceived) deserves protection on these grounds seems arbitrary.  The 
force of conscience, and the respect it is owed, can be the force of a 
purely secular conscience.  The “specialness” of religion eludes us if we 
base it only on these grounds.   
We must look deeper into the content of religion, which I do in the 
next Section after going into more detail on why the “authority defense” 
of religion’s value is mistaken.  The stress on the imperatival force that 
some religious commands have is a formal point.  It is a point about how 
one might feel religion internally—how religion’s commands can feel 
unlike anything we have thought up and imposed on ourselves, and more 
like external commands over which we have no control.  But this feature 
is not unique to religion.  Moreover, if we were to protect only those 
religious claims that are commands from a Supreme Being, then we 
would exclude those religions that are not theistic, such as Buddhism.  I 
side with the Seeger Court in believing that religion does not require 
obedience to a Supreme Being,162 but I oppose the Court when it comes 
to reducing religion to one’s ultimate concerns.  I believe that those 
ultimate concerns must be of a specific type, and we cannot merely rest 
on the formality of the religious claim to discern this type, but must go 
deeper into its content. 
 
 159.  Michael McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.R. 1, 30 
(2000). 
 160. William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal 
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 
206 (2000).   
 161. Koppelman, supra note 137, at 593. 
 162. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 (1965).  See also supra Part II.D. 
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C.  The Value of Religion: Seeing the World as a Gift 
The last Section rejected a “specialness” of religion that focused on 
religious believers as members of two kingdoms, the heavenly kingdom, 
and the earthly kingdom.  There, the point of securing religious liberty 
was to avoid placing citizens in situations where they would have to 
obey either their temporal sovereign or their heavenly sovereign.  This 
might have a simple prudent justification: we do not want to place 
people in these situations because if we did, they might choose to 
disobey earthly laws, or resent such laws should they choose to obey 
them.  But such a justification might also pay respect to the religious 
beliefs of citizens, by crediting them with the possibility that they are 
answering to a higher calling.  In that sense, the state should give them 
the freedom to pursue this higher calling. 
There are two problems with this justification, however, and they 
point us to a better conception of what is special about religion.  The 
first problem is that this justification is arbitrarily underinclusive, 
excluding those citizens who feel bound by a moral commitment that is 
not tied to religion at all.  The state might also want to avoid putting 
people in a situation where they have to choose between obeying the 
state and violating their core moral convictions.  The state may even 
want to show respect to people who feel bound by their moral principle 
in this way.163  In short, we still lack any arguments for why religious 
convictions in particular merit special treatment.  We can say why we 
want to protect people who feel bound by their consciences the same 
way we protect people who feel compelled by their religious 
convictions.  Michael McConnell’s argument that religious claims differ 
from secular claims because the state “cannot categorically deny the 
authority on which such a claim rests”164 seems either false or equally 
applicable to secular moral claims.165 
 
 163. Marshall, supra note 108, at 321 (noting that violation of deeply held secular beliefs 
may cause psychic harm to the believer).   
 164. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 
(1985). 
 165. Andrew Koppelman’s proposed definition of religion-in-general also, I think, 
suffers from overinclusivenss.  Koppelman says that religion identifies humans as flawed and 
offers up a solution.  But this is so vague as to include, inter alia, Marxism and Freudianism.  
See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 133 (2002) (“If there is a 
universal human problem, then it is a matter of some urgency to identify this problem and its 
cure.  Religion-in-general is the set of activities that seek to address this universal human 
problem.”).   
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The second problem is related to the first.  It is that religious 
commands seem to bind us, and the state should respect this sense of 
obligation.  But why is this obligation to a higher authority especially 
valuable?  Is the mere fact of feeling obligated a good thing?  Either the 
value is being bound by true obligations,166 or there is some mysterious 
value merely in being bound by commitments which one thinks are 
mandated by a higher authority.  In other words, either the value of 
obligation is left unexplained, or its explanation has to go to the truth of 
a particular religious vision.  But this presents an unacceptable dilemma.  
On the one hand, the risk in assigning a value to a feeling of obligation is 
that it does not give us any purchase on exactly what value is served by 
protecting people who feel bound.  On the other hand, if we say that the 
value of obeying commands is that they are true commands, then we risk 
collapsing the value of religion into the value of obedience to the true 
religion.  This is something we would want to avoid, until we are forced 
to accept it.  The idea is to explicate what value religion has, rather than 
what value a particular religion has. 
The failures of the previous view give us a good sense of the 
conceptual space we need to fill.  We want to find something that does 
not arbitrarily draw lines between religious and non-religious ways of 
looking at the world.  The idea that we are under commands from an 
authority other than the state does not sufficiently distinguish between 
those who feel bound by religious commands and those who feel bound 
by an ordinary moral obligation to disagree with the state.  We thus have 
an understanding of religion that captures what is unique to religion.  
Furthermore, we also want an understanding of religion that speaks to 
religion’s value.  For instance, we might have a definition of religion 
that specifies religion’s need for a Supreme Being, and we might worry 
that this definition is underinclusive because there are religions that do 
not have a Supreme Being.  But we might also want to know more about 
why a belief in a Supreme Being is valuable—assuming that there is a 
Supreme Being, in which case the value of religion would be the value 
of having true beliefs. 
The idea I propose is that religion is special and has value because 
it perceives human existence as a gift.167  Perceiving existence as a gift is 
not to say it was brutely given to us as a platform or starting point to 
 
 166. Cf. Alexander, supra note 155, at 41 (“True religion is good.”).  See also Stanley 
Fish, Op-Ed, Religion Without Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A15.  
 167. For a meditation on the idea of a gift to which I am greatly indebted, see ANTHONY 
KRONMAN, REFLECTIONS OF A BORN AGAIN PAGAN (forthcoming).  
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which we owe no particular response.  Those who see existence as a gift 
are oriented to the universe in such a way that they see it as something to 
which we owe gratitude, respect, and maybe even awe.  This view is 
expressed in the Book of Psalms, that “it is he that hath made us, and not 
we ourselves.”168  This viewpoint is distinguishable from one that sees 
our only debt of gratitude as one owed to other humans who have 
procured a benefit for us.  From this perspective, one sees the idea that 
the universe is a gift as anthropomorphizing our relationship to the 
world, at best, and engaging in dangerous fantasy at worst.   
It is perhaps hard to grasp the idea of existence as a gift in the 
abstract, but it is a familiar idea in terms that are more tangible.  For 
instance, the idea that we should treat existence as a gift frequently 
appears in bioethics debates, where one side often argues against genetic 
manipulation or cloning on the basis that life is a gift, something which 
is not our own creation and which we should not attempt to manipulate.  
Michael Sandel is a recent example of someone subscribing to this idea: 
“The problem with eugenics and genetic engineering is that they 
represent the one-sided triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of 
dominion over reverence, of molding over beholding.”169  Sandel comes 
close to equating this idea of giftedness with religion by describing the 
rise of efforts at genetic enhancement as jeopardizing “a habit of mind 
and way of being.”170  This is similar to what I have been calling an 
“orientation” to the world.171  This idea, that existence is a gift, is what is 
special about religion.  Religion cultivates and expresses the idea that we 
should orient ourselves to the world as we might orient ourselves to 
something we received as a gift. 
Sandel is of the opinion that this sense of giftedness is not 
necessarily religious, but I disagree.  It is hard to see how we can view 
the universe as a gift while simultaneously holding that there is no sense 
in which it was given to us, that it is by accident or luck that we exist.  It 
seems impossible to hold these two thoughts at the same time.  The idea 
that existence is a gift suggests that we have an obligation to be grateful 
for this gift.  But such a thought is not prompted by the idea that 
something exists by luck, rather than nothing.  The thought that we are 
the products of chance does not seem to dictate that we respond to our 
fortune in any way, whether positive or negative.  It does not suggest 
 
 168. Psalms 100:3.  
 169. MICHAEL SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 85 (2007).   
 170. Id. at 96 (citation omitted).   
 171. See supra Part II.B. 
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that to fritter our lives away would be a waste.  By contrast, the idea that 
our existence has been given as a gift inspires the thought that we have a 
special responsibility toward life. 
I should expand on this idea, for it shows that there is more to 
giftedness than merely an orientation toward the world, one that sees the 
world as a gift rather than as simply where we start.  The idea that we 
have been given a gift leads us to a certain responsiveness and care for 
the universe and our place in it: gratitude, as intimated in the previous 
paragraph.  Further, that the universe is a gift implies that we are to act 
in a way that preserves this gift, and acknowledge our indebtedness to it.  
Compare this to the idea that value exists only in those things which we 
have created, and that the universe is simply a supply of raw materials 
which we can dispose of at our will.  This is the view of John Milton’s 
Satan (to be contrasted with the perspective of the Psalmist, above), that 
he is “self-begot and self-rais’d/ By our own quick’ning power,”172 
owing no debt to anything or anyone because he is his own creation. 
Sandel makes a useful point about the value of seeing the world as 
a gift: “One of the blessings of seeing ourselves as creatures of nature 
[or] God . . . is that we are not wholly responsible for the way we are.”173  
Sandel makes this point in the context of advances in genetic 
engineering.  It is a relief to see the world as a gift, because it is not 
wholly up to us to change it and make it better; there may be value in 
leaving it be and accepting it as is.  Sandel seems to suggest that a 
secular world will tend to ignore this perspective in a boundless quest for 
perfection.  It tends to see the world as something that can be altered and 
endlessly improved by the exercise of human will and intellect—a view 
solely in terms of costs and benefits.  The idea of the world as a gift, an 
idea that I suggest is the basis of religion’s value, may check this restless 
impulse.174   
The idea that existence is a gift to which we are not entitled 
captures the value of religion.  We should test, again, whether this 
definition singles out religion uniquely.  I have already addressed this 
 
 172. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, BOOK 5, at ¶¶ 860-61 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., The 
Odyssey Press, Inc. 1962) (1667). 
 173. SANDEL, supra note 169, at 87.   
 174. Martin Heidegger is probably the best contemporary diagnostician of this “restless” 
impulse.  See, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC 
WRITINGS 311, 320 (David Farrell Krell ed., 1993) (“The earth now reveals itself as a coal 
mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.  The field that the peasant formerly cultivated 
and set in order appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of 
and maintain.”).   
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concern to some extent by declaring that a secular view could not 
capture this sense of giftedness.  How can those who believe the world is 
a product of chance be grateful for existence?  While it first appears that 
such people would be indifferent, a secular argument for gratitude might 
exist. 
Consider the idea that we should be grateful to our tradition, as 
something that has constituted us, and from which we benefit.  Would 
this not be something that also has the value I am ascribing to 
religion?175  It is different, and it will be useful to explain why.  
Tradition is still the work of human hands, and so to be grateful for it is 
to be grateful to something that is human.  What I want to focus on, 
however, and what I am claiming is unique to religion, is gratitude for 
being, something that is not human, and is not given to us by another 
human.  This gratitude is not ordinary gratitude toward a person or 
persons who have given us a benefit, but is gratitude for the fact of 
existing, the condition of all other future benefits.  This is the uniquely 
religious orientation toward the world.  It is an orientation toward the 
whole of existence, and it sees existence as a priceless and undeserved 
gift.   
If there is any serious worry on this level, it is that the idea of 
giftedness is overly tied to religious sensibility and the idea of a 
Supreme Being.176  In other words, how can a gift exist without someone 
who has offered that gift?  And if the gift is existence itself, then who 
could that giver be other than God?  I am not sure how to answer these 
questions.  Can there be a theory that views existence as a gift but does 
not see that gift as coming from someone?  Can the universe exist qua 
gift?  To say such a thing seems perilously close to embracing the 
thought that one could see the universe as a product of fortune, and yet 
still treat it as a gift—a thought that I encourage we reject.  But might 
there be a space between treating the world as a product of chance and 
treating it as a gift, such that one might see the world as a gift (yet 
without supposing a giver) without thinking it merely the result of 
 
 175. See Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990). 
 176. Robert George pressed this objection against Sandel when Sandel presented an 
earlier version of his book to The President’s Council on Bioethics.  See The President’s 
Council on Bioethics: Transcripts, December 12, 2002, Session 4, available at 
http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/dec02/session4.html (statement of Robert George) (“Is 
there an inference that is invited from the understanding of giftedness to the reality of a giver, 
and would it be less than fully reasonable to stop short of drawing that inference?”). 
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chance?177  I am not sure.  Perhaps the idea of the universe as a gift is 
indebted to theology as much as (if not more than) the idea of being 
obedient to a higher sovereign. 
D. Judicial Competency and Religious Meaning 
I leave aside these questions for the remainder of this Article, not 
because they are unimportant, but because they are sufficient to show the 
kind of questions we should be asking when considering the unique 
value of religion.  But we might now have a different type of worry 
about these questions, and it is considering this worry that I want to end 
this Section.  This kind of worry will bring us back to the level of 
constitutional theory and away from theology and anthropology.  We 
should consider not only whether we have the right definition of religion 
(viz. one that captures religion’s unique value), but also whether this 
value makes sense as a constitutional value.  The moral reading of the 
Constitution tends to blur these two things: it seems to suggest that, in 
certain amendments, the vague language gives interpreters license to 
insert moral philosophy.  For instance, in interpreting what is “cruel and 
unusual”178 we are to consider what is truly cruel rather than attempt to 
discern what the Founders thought was cruel. 
But there is another consideration waiting just off the wings, which 
is not that it would be impossible to find these constitutional values, but 
that courts lack the competence to deal with questions of value.  
Regardless of whether this is true in the case of “cruel and unusual,” we 
might think that it applies with even more force in the case of religion.  
Can courts be relied upon to find the value of religion?  To say that such 
an investigation is probably rendered inevitable by the structure of the 
Constitution may be correct, but it misses the deeper point.  It misses the 
point that as part of finding the best interpretation of the constitutional 
value of religion, we should also take into account whether or not courts 
will be able to discern and apply this value in cases that reach them.  
And in this way, we might have a strong second-best argument for the 
liberal reading of religion developed in Part II.  William P. Marshall 
 
 177. Interestingly, John Locke is a good example of one who views the world as a gift 
(which creates certain obligations in us), but also sees this as essentially tied to a Supreme 
Being.  See especially his discussion of property in JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 261, 273-74 (David Wooten ed., 
1993). 
 178. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.   
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makes this second-best argument explicitly when he writes, “Concerns 
with adjudicating religion as a distinct phenomenon mitigate in favor of 
the equality approach, because the equality approach necessarily avoids 
the intractable problems inherent in differentiating between religion and 
nonreligion.”179 
In other words, courts, given their relative competence, may be 
better off with an expansive definition of religion, even if religion does 
have a unique value that is not captured in secular ways of viewing the 
world.  Thus, the liberal would have the better interpretation of religion, 
but not because he has correctly shown that the value of religion is also 
contained in secular ways of viewing world.  The liberal would have the 
better interpretation because of the constraints of the Constitution, and 
the role of the courts within the structure outlined by the Constitution.  
Again, this would be a second-best argument; it does not necessarily 
speak to the ideal of what we would want our Constitution and our 
courts to be.   
CONCLUSION 
Much of this Article concentrated on the theoretical roots of 
Eisgruber and Sager’s proposal to read the First Amendment in a secular 
way.  I tried to trace the impulse behind this proposal—which seemingly 
conflicts with the plain text of the First Amendment—to liberalism’s 
core idea that the state should neutrally treat all forms of beliefs, 
including religious beliefs.  I implicitly suggested that one cannot look at 
Eisgruber and Sager’s proposal as simply an exercise in constitutional 
law; to understand it, we need to look at it from the broader perspective 
of intellectual history.  But from this perspective, we see the obvious 
appeal of a secular First Amendment, and we should interpret it in a way 
that understands “religion” to mean “conceptions of the good” or, to use 
the Rawlsian idiom, “comprehensive conceptions.”180 
Indeed, the idea that the First Amendment should be read in a 
wholly secular way gives an appealing and unifying vision of the First 
Amendment.  On this reading, each of the various parts of the First 
Amendment (e.g., free speech, free press, association), when added to 
the idea of “religion” as comprehensive doctrine, creates a First 
Amendment that treats the individual’s view of the world as important, 
 
 179. Marshall, supra note 160, at 213.   
 180. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 13. 
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and does not give priority to any one way of looking at the world.  There 
is no competing push in the First Amendment requiring one way of 
looking at the world to receive greater protection than other ways of 
looking at the world.181  On this picture we might not, pace Eisgruber 
and Sager, merely find the First Amendment to be redundant with other 
parts of the Constitution, but even redundant with other parts of the First 
Amendment itself.  Free speech is important because it allows us to 
express ourselves; free exercise is likewise important for this reason 
(although exercise may also include more than just speech, but 
constitutional “speech” also includes more than just speech).182 
In the final Part of this Article, I argued, with some hesitation, for a 
more pluralistic view that sees the First Amendment as containing more 
than simply secular values.  On this alternative picture, the First 
Amendment gives a special place to a particular way of looking at the 
world, the religious point of view, because this way has a special value 
that other ways do not have.  Accordingly, we try to give that (religious) 
value a certain priority, giving it more protection than other ways of 
looking at the world.  This particular value is the perception of the world 
as a gift, not simply existing for our own use, but something that we 
have an obligation to acknowledge and appreciate.  Even if this is not the 
right value, however, it still subscribes to a version of the First 
Amendment that is distinct from a wholly liberal version, without giving 
preference to a uniquely religious way of conceiving the world.  The 
reading I proffered is different from what Eisgruber and Sager poorly 
describe as a “secular value at the core of religious liberty.”183  Instead, I 
maintain that there is a religious value at the core of religious liberty—
although there may be other secular values that make up the First 
Amendment.  That religious value, the one protected by the free exercise 
clause, is the value of seeing the world as a gift, as not simply the 
backdrop for our projects but a positive benefit to us, and which creates 
certain obligations of gratitude and response. 
At the same time, I claimed in a second best argument that it might 
be better to embrace the liberal ideal because it is easier for courts to 
 
 181. Cf. Marshall, supra note 108, at 320 (“Most obviously, a constitutional preference 
for religious belief cuts at the heart of the central principle of the Free Speech Clause—that 
every idea is of equal dignity and status in the marketplace of ideas.”).   
 182. See id. at 327 (arguing that religion should be treated as a product of man’s freedom 
rather than his external obligation, and finding this view “more consistent with the 
commitment to freedom expressed in the First Amendment itself”).   
 183. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 1, at 609. 
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interpret religion expansively rather than narrowly, rather than leaving it 
to the courts to decide whether existence is a gift.184  It seems better to 
conclude the Article with the picture of two competing ideals, and to 
leave open the question of which of the two ideals is more attainable.  It 
is important to recognize the idea of religion having a special 
constitutional value, even if we concede that courts are in no position to 
identify that value.  We should at least wrestle with the irony that a 
document dedicated to secular governance nonetheless carves out a 
place for religion.  If for reasons of expediency or principle, we should 
choose, in the end, to replace the unique status of religion in the 
Constitution with something more general and encompassing, and 
recognize the possibility that something—some vision of politics and of 
life—will be lost. 
What is this vision that is at risk of being lost?  Consider how the 
secular First Amendment recognizes no deliberate distinctions between 
ways of looking at the world.  All are equal, but in a kind of leveling 
manner; no one deserves any privilege that is denied to all other points 
of view.  If it is egalitarian and neutral, it is also somewhat one-
dimensional and, for that reason, uninspiring.  By contrast, the pluralistic 
First Amendment, while not diminishing other points of view (at least 
not intentionally), seems to place one particular set of views at its center, 
namely, religious ways of looking at the world.  On this reading, the 
First Amendment is not flat, but tiered, with its hidden foundation being 
religion.  The foundation is hidden because religion cannot be 
established by the state.  Religion, however, is an animating presence in 
the pluralistic First Amendment, recognized as both vital in the lives of 
individual citizens, and as a necessary correction to the secularizing 
trend of government, which considers the world as the object of 
organization and manipulation rather than as a gift. 
Eisgruber and Sager’s book displays a possibly admirable urge to 
refashion the First Amendment as a wholly secular amendment, 
redundant with other amendments of the Constitution.  I have suggested, 
in the course of this Article, how Eisgruber and Sager can do this while 
remaining faithful to the Constitution’s text.  They can make the First 
Amendment secular by broadening the meaning of religion.  Even 
though this may not have a textual cost, however, it may have a different 
and more significant cost.  In other words, even though we might 
construe religion this broadly while talking meaningfully about 
 
 184. See supra Part III. 
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“religion,” it may lead us to miss the tension between the heart of the 
First Amendment and the heart of modern life: the tension between the 
secular and the sacred ways of viewing the world.  This is a tension we 
may never want to resolve entirely; in any case, we should not be in too 
much of a hurry to resolve it.   
 
 
